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OPINION OF THE COURT 
 
GARTH, Circuit Judge: 
 
The issue presented by this appeal is whether the 
plaintiffs, Lorenzo Langford ("Langford") and William Marsh 
("Marsh"), can state a cause of action against a 
municipality, whose annual budget, by reason of a lack of 
funding, eliminated their school positions. W e hold that 
where the plaintiffs' Complaint char ging political retaliation 
alleges that the municipality, Atlantic City, violated their 
constitutional rights, it was error for the District Court to 
dismiss their Complaint pursuant to Federal Rule of 
Procedure 12(b)(6). We will r everse. 
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I 
 
In March 1998, the Atlantic City Board of Education, 
which employed plaintiffs Langford and Marsh, adopted a 
proposed budget for the 1998-99 school year . The budget 
did not include funding for several programs and nine 
supervisory jobs, including Langford's and Marsh's jobs.1 A 
total of approximately $1.4 million was needed to fund 
those programs and jobs which were excluded from the 
proposed budget. The unfunded programs included certain 
school sports, transportation for some extra-curricular 
activities and the continued use and operation of 
community schools. Funding for these programs and jobs 
was not included in the budget because their pr ojected 
costs exceeded the maximum budget increase allowable 
under New Jersey law. 
 
On March 31, 1998, the Board of Education passed a 
resolution asking Atlantic City voters to appr ove a "Budget 
Cap Waiver" in the amount of $1.477 million, to fund all of 
the programs and positions. The voters r ejected the Budget 
Cap Waiver proposal. Notwithstanding that rejection, the 
City Council was empowered without review to approve 
unilaterally the Cap Waiver, and thus fund the threatened 
positions and programs. 
 
Langford and Marsh had opposed Mayor James Whelan 
and the City Council defendants in the 1994 and 1998 
elections. In the Atlantic City mayoral election held on May 
12, 1998, Langford had run against, and lost to, Mayor 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
1. Marsh was the Neighborhood Facilities Coordinator. His 
responsibilities included coordinating and scheduling the community use 
of high school facilities, supervising other employees, hiring staff for 
adult and evening programs at school facilities, developing community 
education programs for adults, and overseeing school buildings for civil 
and community purposes. Marsh received an annual salary of $79,000 
plus "lucrative employee benefits." 
 
Langford was the Neighborhood Facilities Liaison. Langford's 
responsibilities included organizing and supervising weeknight and 
weekend community activities and events at a school facility, ensuring 
maximum use of the school facility by the community, and assigning 
security to cover events at the facility. His annual salary was $30,000, 
together with employment benefits. 
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Whelan, Atlantic City's incumbent mayor. On May 15, 
1998, the City Council voted to eliminate Langfor d's and 
Marsh's jobs as part of the budget reduction plan. Plaintiffs 
allege that their jobs were eliminated in r etaliation for their 
political opposition to the Mayor in the 1998 election. 
 
II 
 
On June 29, 1999, Langford and Marsh filed the instant 
action in the District of New Jersey against the City of 
Atlantic City as well as its individual City Council members 
and Mayor Whelan. The defendants moved to dismiss the 
Complaint, asserting that it did not state a cause of action 
under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). The District 
Court granted that motion, and on December 27, 1999, the 
District Court dismissed all counts of Langfor d's and 
Marsh's Complaint against all defendants. In doing so, the 
District Court held that the individual defendants had 
immunity because their acts were legislative in nature. 
 
As to Atlantic City, the District Court held that the 
passage of a budget does not constitute an official policy, 
custom, or practice triggering section 1983 municipal 
liability under Monell v. New York City Dep't of Soc. Servs., 
436 U.S. 658, 691-95 (1978), and its progeny. The District 
Court distinguished the Monell line of cases, asserting that 
"[t]he single act in those cases is the act adopting the 
policy, not the act in furtherance of carrying out the policy." 
It reasoned that a single, official act cr eating policy suffices 
under Monell and Pembaur v. City of Cincinnati, 475 U.S. 
469, 485 (1986), to establish municipal liability. 
 
Langford and Marsh appeal only the dismissal of their 
section 1983 claims against the municipality -- Atlantic 
City. They do not appeal the District Court's dismissal of 
their section 1983 claims against the individual defendants. 
Langford's and Marsh's appeal was timely filed on February 
17, 2000, and we have jurisdiction over the District Court's 
final order of December 27, 1999 pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 
S 1291.2 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
2. Plaintiffs filed a motion to alter or amend the judgment, on January 
6, 2000, pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Pr ocedure 59(e). The District 
Court denied plaintiffs' Rule 59(e) motion. Because we reverse the 
District Court's dismissal of the Complaint, we do not reach appellants' 
contention that the District Court erred in denying that motion. 
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III 
 
Our standard of review is plenary and, in the context of 
a Rule 12(b)(6) decision by the District Court which 
dismissed all defendants and all counts of plaintif fs' 
Complaint, we adhere to the precepts which we 
summarized in Nami v. Fauver, 82 F.3d 63, 65 (3d Cir. 
1996): 
 
       We must determine whether, under any reasonable 
       reading of the pleadings, the plaintiffs may be entitled 
       to relief, and we must accept as true the factual 
       allegations in the complaint and all reasonable 
       inferences that can be drawn therefr om. The complaint 
       will be deemed to have alleged sufficient facts if it 
       adequately put the defendants on notice of the 
       essential elements of the plaintiffs' cause of action. 
       Since this is a S 1983 action, the plaintif fs are entitled 
       to relief if their complaint sufficiently alleges 
       deprivation of any right secured by the Constitution. In 
       considering a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, we do not inquir e 
       whether the plaintiffs will ultimately pr evail, only 
       whether they are entitled to offer evidence to support 
       their claims. Thus, the district court's order granting 
       the defendants' motion to dismiss will be affir med only 
       if it appears that the plaintiffs could pr ove no set of 
       facts that would entitle them to relief. 
 
Id. (citations omitted). 
 
IV 
 
42 U.S.C. S 1983, the section relied upon by Langford 
and Marsh in their Complaint, subjects to liability every 
person who under color of state law or custom deprives a 
citizen of his or her constitutional rights. The Supreme 
Court in Monell, 436 U.S. 658, held that a municipality can 
be held liable as a person under section 1983 when it 
unconstitutionally implements or enforces "a policy 
statement, ordinance, regulation, or decision officially 
adopted and promulgated by" the officers of that 
municipality. Id. at 690.3 By contrast, the Court expressly 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
3. Notwithstanding the Court's statement in Monell, the word "policy" 
does not appear in the text of section 1983. See City of Oklahoma City 
v. Tuttle, 471 U.S. 808, 841 (1985) (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
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rejected municipal S 1983 liability based on a respondeat 
superior theory, finding "Congress did not intend 
municipalities to be held liable unless action pursuant to 
official municipal policy of some nature caused a 
constitutional tort." Id. at 691. 
 
In Monell, a class of female employees of the Department 
of Social Services and the Board of Education of New York 
City brought suit under section 1983, alleging that the City, 
through its agencies, had as a matter of official policy 
unconstitutionally compelled pregnant employees to take 
unpaid leaves of absence before they wer e medically 
necessary. Id. at 661. "[I]t is when execution of a 
government's policy or custom, whether made by its 
lawmakers or by those whose edicts or acts may fairly be 
said to represent official policy, inflicts the injury that the 
government as an entity is responsible under S 1983." Id. at 
694. The Court concluded that New York City was liable 
under section 1983 because its policy respecting the 
unpaid leaves of absence for pregnant employees violated 
their constitutional rights. Id. at 692. 
 
A significant portion of the discussion conducted before 
the District Court in this case focused on the Supr eme 
Court's decision in Pembaur, 475 U.S. 469, where both the 
county and the city were held liable for a county 
prosecutor's instruction to deputy sherif fs to break into a 
doctor's office to effect an arrest. Id. at 485. The Court 
noted that the municipal policy requirement discussed in 
Monell "was intended to distinguish acts of the municipality 
from acts of employees of the municipality, and thereby 
make clear that municipal liability is limited to action for 
which the municipality is actually responsible." Id. at 479. 
 
Pembaur held that the Fourth Amendment was violated 
and that a municipality is liable for "acts which the 
municipality has officially sanctioned or or dered." Id. at 
480. The Court concluded that "a municipality may be liable 
under S 1983 for a single decision by its pr operly constituted 
legislative body -- whether or not that body had taken 
similar action in the past or intended to do so in the future 
-- because even a single decision by such a body 
unquestionably constitutes an act of official government 
policy." Id. (emphasis added). "W e hold that municipal 
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liability under S 1983 attaches where-- and only where -- 
a deliberate choice to follow a course of action is made from 
among various alternatives by the official or officials 
responsible for establishing final policy with respect to the 
subject matter in question." Id. at 483-84. 
 
In both Owen v. City of Independence, 445 U.S. 622 
(1980), and City of Newport v. Fact Concerts, Inc., 453 U.S. 
247, 250-52 (1981), the Supreme Court consistently held 
that a single decision of a properly constituted legislative 
body is an act of official policy that may subject the 
municipality to section 1983 liability. In Owen , the Court 
ruled that the joint actions of the city manager and the city 
council in firing Owen violated his constitutional right to a 
pretermination hearing, even though the officials had acted 
in good faith. Owen, 445 U.S. at 630, 657. In Newport, the 
Court considered a section 1983 claim against a 
municipality that was premised on the unconstitutional 
conduct of the Newport City Council, Newport's legislative 
body. The plaintiff alleged that the Newport City Council's 
cancellation of its license to present musical concerts 
amounted to a violation of its constitutional rights of free 
expression and due process. Newport , 453 U.S. at 252. The 
Court upheld a jury verdict imposing compensatory 
damages against the city, although it held that a 
municipality is immune from punitive damages under 
section 1983. Id. at 271. 
 
Concededly, Monell, Pembaur, Owen, and Newport were 
not concerned with the enactment of budgets that affected 
an aggrieved plaintiff. However, we have recognized that 
municipalities may be subject to section 1983 liability for 
legislatively-enacted budget decisions that have an 
unconstitutional effect. See Carver v. Foerster, 102 F.3d 96 
(3d Cir. 1996). In so holding, we have spoken in terms of 
"legislative immunity." We recognize that Atlantic City did 
not claim legislative immunity as a defense to its asserted 
liability nor did the District Court refer to legislative 
immunity in connection with Atlantic City's liability as it 
did with respect to the individual defendants. Yet, the 
budgetary decisions to which we refer, infra, have alluded 
to and couched their liability analyses in ter ms of immunity 
as well as the policy statements to which Monell  refers. 
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In Carver, 102 F.3d 96, we held that Allegheny County 
did not enjoy legislative immunity when it committed a 
constitutional wrong. In Carver, the district court had 
rejected claims that the defendants, including Allegheny 
County, were entitled to legislative immunity from section 
1983 suits. The plaintiffs there had char ged that Foerster, 
who was the Chairman of the Board of Commissioners of 
Allegheny County, and Allegheny County had eliminated 
their positions because they had supported a candidate, 
Joe Brimmeier, who had run in the Democratic primary for 
Prothonotary. Foerster had opposed Brimmeier , but 
Brimmeier had been supported by the Carver plaintif fs. 
Brimmeier lost. 
 
Ultimately, the plaintiffs were fir ed, and the Salary Board 
eliminated their positions, after a "hit list" of Brimmeier 
supporters had been compiled. We noted in Carver that the 
"defendants assert that the positions wer e eliminated as 
part of a larger attempt to keep down administrative costs. 
The defendants further contended that at the same two 
sessions where the plaintiffs lost their positions, the Salary 
Board took additional actions affecting 19 other county 
departments, resulting in the elimination of twenty two 
other positions." Id. at 98. 
 
We affirmed the district court's denial of summary 
judgment, holding that a city did not enjoy legislative 
immunity.4 As Carver explains, quoting Owen, 445 U.S. at 
654: 
 
       the central purpose of the Civil Rights Act was to 
       provide citizens with a remedy against those who had 
       abused state power. It hardly seems unjust to require 
       a municipal defendant which has violated a citizen's 
       constitutional rights to compensate him for the injury 
       suffered thereby. Indeed Congr ess enacted S 1983 
       precisely to provide a remedy for such abuses of official 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
4. The Carver court took jurisdiction over a denial of summary judgment 
analyzing the claims of absolute immunity as falling within the collateral 
order doctrine of Cohen v. Beneficial Indus. Loan Corp., 337 U.S. 541, 
546 (1949). Carver, 102 F.3d at 98-99. See also Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 
U.S. 511, 525 (1985), and Acierno v. Cloutier, 40 F.3d 597, 606 (3d Cir. 
1994). 
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       power. . . . The knowledge that a municipality will be 
       liable for all of its injurious conduct . . . should create 
       an incentive for officials who may harbor doubts about 
       the lawfulness of their intended actions to err on the 
       side of protecting citizens' constitutional rights. 
 
Carver, 102 F.3d at 104 (citation and internal quotations 
omitted). In the present case, Atlantic City eliminated the 
jobs of political opponents of the incumbent mayor . As in 
Carver, budgetary shortfall was the ostensible r eason for 
the elimination. 
 
Carver is not alone in its holding that absolute immunity 
is not available to a municipality under section 1983, even 
in a budgetary context. The Fourth Circuit has held, en 
banc, that budgetary decisions render ed through legislative 
enactments may subject municipalities to section 1983 
liability. Berkley v. Common Council of Charleston, 63 F.3d 
295 (4th Cir. 1995) (en banc). Plaintif fs in that case 
contended that, in enacting the annual budget, 
Charleston's City Council denied plaintiffs a salary increase 
in violation of the First Amendment because plaintif fs had 
opposed the mayoral candidate supported by a majority of 
the Council. Id. at 302. The district court dismissed the 
plaintiffs' complaint, and the Fourth Cir cuit reversed. Id. at 
303.5 
 
In Goldberg v. Town of Rocky Hill , 973 F.2d 70, 74 (2d 
Cir. 1992), the Second Circuit held that the Town was not 
entitled to a legislative immunity defense for its elimination 
of the plaintiff 's job by budgetary, and hence legislative, 
action in alleged retaliation for his contr oversial views. 
Plaintiff was one of the Town's five supernumerary, part- 
time police officers. After the plaintiff publicly supported a 
controversial act by the Town's police chief, the Town 
Council "eliminated from the budget entir ely the positions 
of all supernumerary police officers." The District Court 
rejected the Town's absolute immunity defense and denied 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
5. In a spirited dissent, Judge Wilkinson, joined by Judges Russell and 
Widener, argued that the imposition of section 1983 liability for 
legislative budget decisions was unsupported by the text of section 1983, 
by the canon of construction requiring clear statement, and by several 
policy grounds. Id. at 303-10. 
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its motion to dismiss pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) of the 
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Id.  at 71. The Second 
Circuit affirmed. Id. at 74-75. 
 
The Eleventh Circuit has also held a municipality liable 
under section 1983 for passing a budget ordinance that 
had abolished the plaintiff 's job and demoted him into a 
newly-created and lower-paying position. The plaintiff 
alleged that it did so in retaliation for the exercise of his 
First Amendment rights. Williams v. City of Valdosta, 689 
F.2d 964, 969 (11th Cir. 1982). The Eleventh Circuit cited 
Monell's holding that a municipality "can be sued directly 
under S 1983 . . . where . . . the action that is alleged to be 
unconstitutional implements or executes a[n] .. . ordinance 
. . . officially adopted and promulgated by that body's 
officers," id. (citing Monell, 436 U.S. at 690), and concluded 
that municipal liability could be established. 
 
Hence, despite the reservations expressed by the District 
Court, we are satisfied and accordingly hold, as do Monell 
and Carver, that a municipality (in this case, Atlantic City) 
can be held liable for its unconstitutional acts in 
formulating and passing its annual budget. 
 
V 
 
As previously stated, in reviewing a motion to dismiss 
under Rule 12(b)(6), we must accept the allegations of the 
complaint as true and draw all reasonable infer ences in the 
light most favorable to the plaintiffs. Semerenko v. Cendant 
Corp., 223 F.3d 165, 180 (3d Cir. 2000); Nami, 82 F.3d at 
65. Here, the essence of Langford's and Marsh's Complaint 
is that Atlantic City eliminated their school positions in 
retaliation for their political views and activities. They allege 
"that they were retaliated against by defendants, in 
violation of S 1983, for engaging in political activities and 
protected speech regarding matters of public concern, and 
that their political activities and protected speech were a 
substantial motivating factor in the decision by defendants 
to eliminate their jobs." Compl. P 2. They claim that Atlantic 
City deprived them of their First and Fourteenth 
Amendment rights when it, as one of the defendants, 
"under color of state law, eliminated and/or caused the 
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elimination of plaintiffs' positions with the Atlantic City 
Board of Education in retaliation for plaintiffs' political 
activities and/or plaintiffs' political campaigning and/or 
plaintiffs' vigorous and public criticism of and opposition to 
the political agendas, positions and endeavors of the said 
defendants regarding matters and issues of public 
concern." Id. PP 20, 92, 93, 96. 
 
Throughout their Complaint, Langford and Marsh 
describe the opposing political forces, the political activities, 
and their political opposition to and public criticism of the 
Atlantic City administration, culminating in the passage of 
the budget that targeted their positions. For example, 
paragraph 44 of the Complaint recites that"Langford 
criticized and spoke out frequently, openly and publicly 
against defendants and their political agendas, positions 
and/or views regarding matters and issues of public 
concern." Id. P 44. Similarly, paragraph 46 alleges that 
"plaintiff Marsh criticized and spoke out openly, publicly 
and frequently against the City Council defendants, 
defendant Whelan and defendants' political agendas, 
positions and views regarding matters of public concern." 
Again, paragraph 50 includes allegations that "Langford 
and Marsh openly, publicly and vigorously opposed, 
rebuked and criticized the City Council defendants and 
defendant Whelan for positions they had taken, endeavors 
they had supported and/or agendas they had pr omoted on 
a variety of matters and issues of public concer n." 
 
It is true that the Complaint is redundant in many 
respects, but it is clear that both Langfor d and Marsh have 
made no secret of their position that "Defendants seized 
upon and took advantage of their success in the 1998 
elections as an opportunity to retaliate against and punish 
plaintiffs for their political campaigning, political beliefs 
and/or political opposition to and strong criticism of 
defendants and defendants' political agendas, positions and 
views; and defendants took retaliatory and punitive action 
against plaintiffs at their first opportunity following the May 
12, 1998 elections." Id. P 56. Those allegations more than 
suffice for us to reverse the District Court's order of 
dismissal. If for the purpose of this opinion we, as we must, 
accept as true the allegations in the Complaint and the 
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inferences to be drawn therefrom, plaintiffs have alleged 
that they are entitled to relief because they were deprived of 
rights secured by the Constitution. Whether they can prove 
the allegations they have set forth in their Complaint is not 
for us to consider. It is sufficient at the Rule 12(b)(6) stage, 
that crediting the plaintiffs' allegations as we must, they 
are entitled to prevail against a motion to dismiss. Nami, 82 
F.3d at 65. 
 
VI 
 
We will reverse the December 27, 1999 decision of the 
District Court and remand to the District Court for further 
proceedings in accordance with the for egoing opinion. 
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